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By Dr Flora Whitmarsh, Grantham Institute
This blog forms part of a series addressing some of the criticisms often levelled against efforts to mitigate climate change.
The Twentieth Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 20) – the latest in a series of meetings of the decision making body of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change –began in Lima this week. Many in the media are quick to point to the difficulty of obtaining international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions reductions, and to denounce COP 15, which took place in Copenhagen in 2009, as a failure. Far from being a failure, the Copenhagen meeting paved the way for future climate change action. World leaders agreed ‘that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time’ and emphasised their ‘strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’, and it was agreed that ‘deep cuts in global emissions are required’. The Copenhagen accord also said that a new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund would be established to support developing countries to limit or reduce carbon dioxide emissions and to adapt to the effects of climate change.
The last objective is in progress: the green climate fund was set up at COP 16, held in Cancun, Mexico in 2010, and several major countries have pledged money. Japan has pledged $1.5 billion, the US has pledged $3 billion, Germany and France have pledged $1 billion each, the UK pledged $1.13 billion and Sweden pledged over $500m. This brings us close to the informal target of raising $10 billion by the end of the year. The goal is to increase funding to $100 billion a year by 2020. There have also been several smaller donations. This is a key step in tackling climate change, because the gap between developed and developing countries in their ability to respond to climate change and their level of responsibility for causing the problem must be addressed.
Obtaining international agreement to reduce emissions is a real challenge. It is not surprising that it is difficult to reach consensus on a course of action between a large range of different countries at different stages of development who bear differing levels of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions to date: the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change has 196 Parties. However, there has been significant progress towards global emissions reductions, led by the EU, China and the US.
Prior to the Copenhagen COP, the UK Climate Change Act was passed in 2008, and contains a legally binding commitment to reduce UK emissions by at least 80% on 1990 levels by 2050. In addition, the UK Committee on Climate Change has recommended an emissions reduction of 50% on 1990 levels by 2025 in order to meet the longer term target. Some have argued that by taking unilateral action, the UK put itself at risk of losing out economically to countries that had not made such pledges. Competitiveness concerns have been evaluated by the Committee on Climate Change, the body set up as part of the Climate Change Act to advise the UK government on emissions targets. The committee found that ‘costs and competitiveness risks associated with measures to reduce direct emissions (i.e. related to burning of fossil fuels) in currently legislated carbon budgets are manageable.’ Continued support from the EU emissions trading scheme may be needed in the 2020s, but this depends on progress towards a global deal.
By making this commitment the UK has been able to enter into negotiations with other countries from a position of strength. The UK is one of the leading historic emitters of carbon dioxide – it is, of course, the sum total of our emissions beginning in the industrial revolution that will, to a good approximation, determine humanity’s impact on the climate, not the emissions in any given year – and therefore it is right that the UK took the lead by making this commitment. Had we not made such a pledge, it would have put us in a more difficult position when negotiating with other countries, particularly those still on the path to development.
The UK is not now acting alone – other major countries have recently made significant emissions reduction pledges. The recent European Council agreement that the EU should cut emissions by 40% on 1990 levels by 2030 represents a step forward. It was decided that all member states should participate, ‘balancing considerations of fairness and solidarity.’ It was also decided that 27% of energy consumed in the EU should be from renewable sources by 2030, and a more interconnected European energy market should be developed to help deal with the intermittency of renewable sources of energy.
The EU target is still not quite as ambitious as the UK target. However, this latest EU agreement is a significant step in the right direction and demonstrates that international cooperation on a large scale is possible, albeit within a body like the EU with pre-existing economic ties. In addition, it generally costs more to cut emissions the faster the cuts are implemented. If the world is genuine in its commitment to tackling climate change, very significant emissions reductions are ultimately required, and delaying action means having to cut emissions more quickly at a later date – at a higher cost. In addition, the Committee on Climate Change found that despite short term increases in electricity prices, early action means that UK electricity prices are projected to be lower in the medium term compared to a fossil fuel intensive pathway, assuming there is an increase in the carbon price in the future.
A recent development is the bilateral agreement between China and the US. China stated that its emissions would peak by 2030, by which time the country aims to get 20% of its energy from non-fossil fuel sources, and the US pledged to reduce its emissions by 26%-28% on 2005 levels by 2025. Some have suggested that the agreement does not go far enough because China’s emissions will continue to rise until 2030 under the deal, and the US target is not as stringent as the EU or UK targets. However, these pledges coming in the lead up to Lima from the two largest emitters globally are hugely significant, and pave the way for further progress. China has already made significant progress in reducing the energy intensity (energy per unit of GDP) of its economy: the 11th Five Year Plan, covering the period 2006-2010 aimed to reduce energy intensity by 20%, and achieved a reduction of 19.1%. Despite some disruption to the energy supply, this success in meeting the target demonstrates the Chinese government’s track record of achieving its objectives on green growth. The current five year plan aims to cut energy intensity and carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit of GDP) by a further 16% and 17% respectively on 2010 levels by 2015. It is right that developing countries should be able to grow their economies – China’s per capita GDP is still relatively low – and this has to be balanced with climate change targets.
The EU, China and the US together accounted for just over half of total global carbon dioxide emissions in 2013. Their pledges demonstrate that smaller groups of countries made up of the major emitters can make a difference without waiting for far-reaching international agreement on emissions reductions. Their willingness to act also has the potential to spur other industrialised countries into reducing their own emissions. More action is still needed, but there has been significant progress since the Copenhagen conference, which should pave the way for more ambitious pledges.
By Ajay Gambhir, Research fellow on mitigation policy at the Grantham Institute
The United Nations Climate Summit 2014, to be held in New York on 23rd September, comes at an important point in the calendar for discussions on how to address climate change. Next year will see nations submit pledges on their future greenhouse gas emissions levels, as part of the United Nations process culminating in the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris at the end of 2015, the ambition of which is to secure a global agreement to tackle climate change.
There is now a rich body of evidence on the implications of mitigation at the global, regional and national levels. This note presents some of the evidence, revealed by research in the Grantham Institute over recent years, which supports the view that mitigation remains feasible and affordable.
Technologies and costs of a global low-carbon pathway
The Grantham Institute, in partnership with Imperial College’s Energy Futures Laboratory (EFL) demonstrated a relatively simple, transparent analysis of the relative costs of a low-carbon versus carbon-intensive global energy system in 2050. The report concluded that mitigation in line with a 2 degrees Celsius limit to global warming would cost less than 1% of global GDP by 2050 (excluding any potentially significant co-benefits from improved air quality and enhanced energy security).
Joint Grantham and EFL report: Halving global CO2 by 2050: Technologies and Costs
The importance of India and China
The two most populous nations, India and China, have undergone rapid economic growth in recent decades, resulting in significantly increased demand for fossil fuels, with associated increases in their CO2 emissions. Mapping pathways towards a low-carbon future for both regions presents challenges in terms of technology choices, affordability and the interplay with land, water and other resources. The Grantham Institute, in partnership with other research groups (including IIASA and UCL), has produced long-term visions of both regions using energy technology modelling and detailed technology and resource assessments, to set out pathways to very low-carbon economies which can be achieved at relatively modest costs. In addition, the Institute has undertaken assessments of the feasibility and cost of achieving the regions’ near-term (2020) Cancun pledges.
Grantham Report 1: An assessment of China’s 2020 carbon intensity target
Grantham Report 2: China’s energy technologies to 2050
Grantham Report 4: An assessment of India’s 2020 carbon intensity target
Grantham Report 5: India’s CO2 emissions pathways to 2050
Key sectors and technologies
Reports have been produced on a number of key technologies across all economic sectors and on the role that these can play in a low-carbon world: electric and other low-carbon vehicles in the transport sector; low-carbon residential heating technologies; other building efficiency and low-carbon options; and a range of technologies and measures to reduce emissions from industrial manufacturing.
The successful development and deployment of a range of low-carbon power sector technologies will be central to decarbonising the power generation sector over the coming decades, thereby providing the basis for low-carbon electrification in the building, transport and industrial sectors. The Institute has produced briefing papers on the technological status, economics and policies to promote solar photovoltaics and carbon capture and storage (including with bioenergy to produce net negative emissions).
Grantham briefing paper 2: Road transport technology and climate change mitigation
Grantham briefing paper 3: Carbon capture technology: future fossil fuel use and mitigating climate change
Grantham briefing paper 4: Carbon dioxide storage
Grantham briefing paper 6: Low carbon residential heating
Grantham briefing paper 7: Reducing CO2 emissions from heavy industry: a review of technologies and considerations for policy makers
Grantham briefing paper 8: Negative emissions technologies
Grantham briefing paper 10: Shale gas and climate change
Grantham briefing paper 11: Solar Power for CO2 mitigation
Grantham Report 3: Reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in the global building sector to 2050
Competitiveness
A critical consideration in any nation or region’s mitigation strategy is the degree to which a low-carbon transition might put its industries at risk of losing competitiveness against rivals in regions with less stringent mitigation action. In a landmark study using responses from hundreds of manufacturing industries across the European Union, researchers at the Institute, in partnership with the Imperial College Business School and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, have produced robust evidence to support the contention that the EU’s Emissions Trading System has not produced any significant competitiveness impacts or industry relocation risks.
On the empirical content of carbon leakage criteria in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme – Ecological Economics (2014)
Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme – American Economic Review (2014)
Global energy governance reform
The energy policies of governments around the world will, to a large extent, determine global greenhouse gas emissions. Western governments cooperate on their energy policies through the International Energy Agency (IEA), which is a powerful advocate and analyst of low carbon energy strategies. Unfortunately the IEA excludes developing nations, such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, from its membership. The Grantham Institute is working with China’s Energy research Institute (ERI) to advise the Chinese government on China’s options for greater engagement in international energy cooperation, including closer association with the IEA. China’s participation is important for world energy security and affordability – the other main objectives of energy policy – as well as for climate mitigation. A consultation draft report published by this ERI/Grantham project is at Global energy governance reform and China’s participation. An earlier report by the Grantham Institute with Chatham House is at Global energy governance reform.
By Ajay Gambhir
A fortnight ago a journalist at New Scientist asked me if I’d seen the latest report by the Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency (PBL) and Joint Research Centre (JRC) on last year’s global CO2 emissions figures. He wanted some quick reactions on analysis that showed China’s emissions per unit of economic output (its “emissions intensity”) had declined by over 4% in 2012, compared to 2011 levels. The following analysis is based on my response.
In absolute terms, China’s emissions actually increased by about 3% in 2012, according to the PBL/JRC analysis. But its GDP increased by almost 8% over the course of 2012, so a 3% increase in emissions means between a 4 and 5% decrease in CO2 emissions intensity.
This compares with the 3.5% annual CO2 intensity reduction target in the 12th Five Year Plan, which covers the period 2011-2015 inclusive. 3.5% is the average annual rate of CO2 intensity reductions required over the period 2005-2020, in order that China meets its Copenhagen Accord target (40-45% reduction on 2005 levels by 2020).
What’s particularly interesting is that these reductions have come largely from an increase in renewable energy displacing coal (as opposed, for example, to the offshoring of carbon-intensive industrial output) – lots of hydro, wind and increasingly solar is being deployed in the Chinese power sector. Whilst no form of electricity generation source avoids at least one of the potential problems of local environmental impacts, high costs or variability of output, the increasing share of near-zero-carbon sources in the generation mix gives grounds for optimism in an economy where coal is still dominant (and about 1 coal-fired power station is still being built per week).
However, the challenge to reduce China’s emissions intensity in line with international action that would limit global warming to about 2OC above pre-industrial levels remains a major one. The analysis that I and colleagues at Imperial College and IIASA undertook in 2011 indicated that, if China grew as then projected, with a 6-fold increase in GDP between 2010 and 2050, and its emissions declined to a level of around 3 GtCO2 (equivalent to 1.7 tonnes of CO2 per person) by 2050, compared to about 8 GtCO2 in 2010, it would have to reduce its emissions intensity by 6-7% per year on average over that period. This gives an indication of the size of the transformation required.
Also worthy of note is the uncertainty around emissions levels in China. The PBL/JRC analysis has CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement rising from about 9.6 GtCO2 in 2011 to 9.9 GtCO2 in 2012, a 3% rise. By contrast the Global Carbon Project’s estimates, released on 18th November, show Chinese emissions rising from 9.1 GtCO2 in 2011 to 9.6 GtCO2 in 2012 – an almost 6% rise. The emissions in these two estimates are not directly comparable, largely because the former includes emissions from international aviation and shipping attributed to China, whereas the latter doesn’t. But estimating emissions is not an exact science (with PBL/JRC noting that there is a 10% range of uncertainty in the Chinese emissions figures), and these two different perspectives tell two different stories.
Nevertheless, during this period of still-strong economic growth it is interesting to see that China’s economy continues to get less carbon intensive. In fact, according to analysis by the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC) earlier this month, China’s CO2 intensity goals for the period 2005 to 2020 mean it is being more ambitious than a range of other countries including the USA and EU27. The challenge now is to meet the 2020 target and then increase the rate of carbon intensity reductions thereafter.
The full New Scientist article is available here.